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CHAPTER 6. GREAT BRiTAin
Introduction 
Britain’s colonial legacy, together with various migratory movements in 
the 20th century, has led to an unprecedented diversity of ethnicities, cul-
tures and religions in the composition of its population. The most recent 
census counts 4.5 million inhabitants of ‘ethnic minority’ background (for 
a population of around 59 million and not counting 700,000 Irish). While 
the history of immigration, notably from the Indian subcontinent and the 
Caribbean, and the formation of ‘post-immigration groups’ in the 20th 
century have been variously explored, recent patterns and new formations 
of cultural diversity are only beginning to be considered. Estimates for the 
recent arrival of Eastern European immigrants from the ‘A8’ accession 
countries vary, and the patterns of settlement and work such as of Poles 
and Lithuanians in the UK are insufficiently documented. ‘Cultural diversity’ 
in Britain today is multifaceted, complex and located in between old and 
established patterns of post-immigration diversity and newly emerging pat-
terns of immigration, settlement and cultural difference. 
The presence, in particular in Britain’s urban centres, of populations 
marked by unprecedented diversity, has been characterised as a new 
form of diversity, ‘super diversity’ (Vertovec, 2007) or ‘hyper diversity’ 
(Muir and Wetherell, 2010). It is suggested that this new diversity chal-
lenges conventional assumptions about how difference should be 
accommodated. Contemporary formations of ‘difference’, such as the 
presence of people of 179 nationalities in contemporary London, are 
seen to imply new challenges that require new and fine-tuned political 
responses. ‘Super diversity’ creates “gaps between policy and practice 
at all levels” (Muir and Wetherell, 2010: 9) and, according to Steven 
Vertovec (2007: 1027-8), challenges an older version of multiculturalism 
that fails to recognize an increasing fragmentation of ‘difference’. 
While new constellations are undoubtedly significant, this picture may be 
incomplete. Demographic differentiation in one urban sphere does not 
change that significant numbers of people, and in particular those who 
are less visible or interesting as specimen of ‘old’ kinds of diversity, con-
tinue to subscribe to overarching identities that show no sign of abating. 
The Fourth Survey, a large quantitative study of identity patterns of British 
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minorities, established the significance of religious identities for British 
Asians (Modood, Berthoud and Lakey, 1997). Such shared experiences of 
diasporic life continue to shape identities, not least in relation to religion, 
for groups that are ready to mobilize around grievances and common 
claims and in particular when shared value commitments are seen to 
be under attack. ‘Super diversity’, new immigration or the emergence 
of ‘hybrid’ identities in one domain of British life do not discount other, 
more consolidated and less differentiated, group positions. The ‘diversity 
challenges’ that this report explores, are thus both old and new—they 
arise in relation to claims for respect, recognition and equality made by 
or on behalf of ethno-religious groups as well as in relation to newly 
emerging, urban and more individualized expressions of cultural diversity. 
For this purpose this report is predominantly concerned with the accom-
modation and more broadly the political negotiation of the difference rep-
resented by two British post-immigration communities, Black-Caribbeans 
and Asians, in particular British Muslims. Our concern with these two com-
munities allows considering relevant debates about cultural diversity, claims 
for equality and accommodation and the political response to such claims. 
In fact, most of the currently salient issues and conflicts over equality and 
cultural diversity can only be understood in the historical context of how 
these communities have made themselves heard and of how their claims 
and politics have been perceived as a ‘challenge’. The mobilization for reli-
gious equality and for the public accommodation of religion occurs against 
the background of concerns that have been raised and debated since, and 
even before, the Rushdie Affair of 1989/90. Contemporary struggles for 
racial equality are connected to the historical experiences of Black Carib-
beans and to the mobilization and protest in response to inequality and 
discrimination, such as the Brixton uprising of 1981. While we do not wish 
to marginalize experiences and issues that do not fit these two narratives, 
we believe that a discussion of the most salient ‘diversity challenges’ of 
contemporary Britain needs to begin with these accounts.
In the first part of the report we thus prepare the ground for the discussion 
and introduce the historical context of current cultural diversity discourses. 
We offer a brief overview of the development of British debates on national 
identity, of British nationality law and race relations legislation. In the second 
part of the report, we provide an overview of the historical presence of the 
two post-immigration communities we are concerned with, Black-Carib-
beans and Asians. We are particularly interested in moments of political 
mobilization and when claims advanced from minority positions were con-
sidered a problem. For the first community, Black Caribbeans, this means 
that we are particularly interested in responses to varying problematisations 
of their presence in Britain and, in particular, in the stigma of ‘black criminal-
ity’. In relation to Muslim claims, we consider the mobilization around claims 
and grievances in relation to the accommodation of religion in public life. 
We then proceed to discuss what the British experience of post-immigration 
diversity implies for ideas of acceptance, accommodation, recognition and 
tolerance and consider the place and development of such notions as public 
values, within law and institutions, and in everyday practices. We suggest 
that Britain finds itself in a position where there is the potential for post-
immigration minorities not merely to be tolerated but to be actively and 
positively recognized and respected. Britain shows potential to move beyond 
a situation where diversity is only a negative challenge, requiring toleration, 
but is turned into a positive experience through equality and respect. This, 
however, remains a potential that for its achievement depends on continued 
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effort, political willpower and pressure from below. We also caution against 
a conception of linear progress. When claims for public recognition and 
equal respect are rejected, the fallback position may not be toleration but 
intolerance and an outright rejection of more minimal positions of forbear-
ance. This could be characterized as the ‘enough already’ position: conces-
sions that in the past were seen to have gone too far are said to require the 
muscular assertion of majority identities and majority claims, which – since 
the two are seen to be linked – is to be achieved primarily through a rejec-
tion of minority demands. Taking notice of ambiguous tendencies, the 
report explores ‘cultural diversity challenges’ with a view to positive oppor-
tunities as well as to the obstacles that are at hand in contemporary Britain.
Great Britain: State formation, national identity and 
citizenship 
Roy Jenkins, then British home secretary, famously defined integra-
tion in 1968 “not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal 
opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of 
mutual tolerance” (Jenkins, 1967: 267). Jenkins’ notion of respect for 
the differences represented by post-immigration communities forms 
a powerful ideal in the development of British multiculturalism. As an 
ideal, it hardly gives a full account of the realities of how cultural diversity 
has been recognized, debated and politically accommodated in Britain. It 
highlights, however, that (some) British policy-makers were ready to 
acknowledge and positively engage with the reality of post-immigration 
diversity. In view of this diversity, Stuart Hall (1999) coined the notion 
‘multicultural drift’ which he considers as the “unintended outcome of 
undirected sociological processes” geared towards an increasing visibility 
of post-immigration groups. In opposition to this drift, mono-cultural 
and racialized conceptions of ‘Britishness’ have been and continue to 
be articulated and to resonate strongly with significant numbers of the 
British population. Adapting the title of Enoch Powell’s infamous 1968 
address, the pollster Ipsos Mori, in its ‘Rivers of Blood Survey’, finds 
that roughly 20% of the population admit to racial prejudices whilst 
significantly higher numbers consider immigration and its impact a nega-
tive (MORI, 2008). While the subsequent parts of this report give a more 
detailed account of the historical formation of ethnic minorities in Britain 
in between those two poles, the ideal of multiculturalism and the ‘spec-
tre’ of homogeneous nationhood, this part prepares the ground with 
some numbers, an excursion into aspects of the development of British 
identity, of British nationality law, race relations policies and, finally, theo-
retical and normative perspectives on cultural diversity in Britain.
The picture of diversity
Reflecting the more than 200 languages spoken (CMEB, 2000: 236), the 
2001 Census revealed that the British population is more ethnically diverse 
than ever before. Alongside the ethnic breakdown the Census shows that 
there are at least 1.6 million people in the United Kingdom who currently 
describe their religious faith as Islam. This represents 2.9% of the British 
population, and makes Islam the most populous faith after Christianity 
(72%); more numerous than Hinduism (less than 1%, numbering 559,000), 
Sikhism (336,000), Judaism (267,000) and Buddhism (152,000). Of the 
Muslim constituency, 42.5% are of Pakistani origin, 16.8% of Bangladeshi, 
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8.5% of Indian, and – most interestingly – 7.5% of other white. This is 
largely taken to mean people of Turkish, Arabic and north-African ethnic 
origin who do not define themselves in racial terms. It will also however 
include East European Muslims from Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as white 
Muslims from across Europe. Black-African (6.2%), Other Asian (5.8%) and 
British (4.1%) dominate the remaining categories of ethnic identification in 
the census options. Even with this heterogeneity, it is still understandable—
if inadequate—that Muslims in Britain are associated first and foremost 
with a South Asian background, especially since they make up roughly 
68% of the British Muslim population.    
Britain’s ethnic minority communities are not equally distributed but concen-
trated in England (95.5% as 9% of the population). In 2001, 45% of the 
ethnic minority population resided in Greater London (19% of all residents) 
and another 8% in region South East of London. 13% live in the West Mid-
lands (conurbation of Birmingham), 8% in the north West (Liverpool, Lan-
cashire), 7% in Yorkshire and Humberside (newcastle) and 6.3% in the East 
Midlands, mainly Leicester, where they represent a third of the population. 
There are 23 constituencies with an ethnic minority population between 
40.5% (Vauxhall) and 66.3% (East Harrow) (OnS, 2003). 85% of all refu-
gees and asylum seekers reside in London or the South West. Immigrants 
and ethnic minorities form distinct, recognisable communities.
British public opinion generally seems appreciative of the fact of cultural 
diversity (MORI, 2005), with a majority (77%) disagreeing with the state-
ment that ‘to be truly British you have to be white’, though 18% agree 
(MORI, 2009). Positive attitudes towards diversity however do not neces-
sarily translate into support for multiculturalism. This might also be a result 
of the dichotomous framing of issues in public discourse (that is replicated 
in survey questions), such as a contrast between ‘celebrating diverse values’ 
(27%) and ‘developing a shared identity’ (41%) (MORI, 2009: 3). What 
this then shows is a wide-spread appreciation of the fact of cultural diver-
sity and a decline of colour racism that is particularly stark in its historical 
dimension (Park et al., 2010). However, this positive spirit does not equally 
extend to more specific attitudes of respect for concrete manifestations of 
diversity, such as for religious identities (Voas and Ling, 2010). 
Table 1. British population by ethnicity
 Ethnicity  Number  Born  Overseas  % of total population  % of all ethnic minorities
Total Population  58.789.194  4.900.000  100 
White  54.153.898  92.4
irish  691.000  1.0
All ethnic minorities  4.635.296  7.9 
Mixed  677.117  1.15  11.0
All black  1.148.738  1.95
Black Caribbean  565.876  238.000  1.0  13.6
Black African  485.277  322.000  0.9  12.9
Black Other  97.585  0.1  1.5
All Asian  2.331.423  3.97
indian  1.053.411  570.000  1.7  21.7
Pakistani  747.285  336.000  1.3  16.7
Bangladeshi  283.063  152.000  0.5  6.1
Chinese  247.403  176.000  0.42  4.2
Other Asian  247.664  0.4  4.7
Other Ethnic  230.615  0.39  7.4
Source: Census 2001
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National identity
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and northern Ireland came into 
being in a series of treaties between its constituent nations, England and 
Wales in 1536, with Scotland in 1707 and with Ireland, thus formalizing 
its long-standing occupation, in 1801. not dissimilar to other nation 
states, its creation involved political, administrative and imaginative 
efforts. Such efforts, however, had to take account of the fact of inter-
nal diversity, represented by the United Kingdom’s constituent nations 
of England, Scotland, Wales and (northern) Ireland, and the legacy of 
empire. 
Linda Colley (1992) suggests that British national identity, based on a 
Protestant culture and in opposition to Catholicism within and to the 
Catholic powers on the continent, was forged in relation to religious 
‘Otherness’ and to the difference represented by the vast overseas ter-
ritories of the colonial empire. Such repertories of identity have been lost 
along with the empire and in line with the declining political salience 
of Protestant religious identification. Devolution and the resurgence of 
national identities in Wales and Scotland have further put into question 
what a source of British identification might be. This sense of uncertainty 
about the content of British national identity has recently become the 
point of departure for political attempts to give new meaning to what it 
means to be British.
This has been a concern for Gordon Brown who in numerous public 
statements since 2005 made the case for a new emphasis on ‘British-
ness’. The content of ‘Britishness’, however, appears somewhat unde-
cided. The definition of particularities that invite identification seems dif-
ficult. Historically, internal diversity had often remained unacknowledged 
and attributes that were considered British had been revealed as mere 
generalizations of cultural Englishness. Englishness, however, will be 
less than welcome in Scotland and Wales, and a comprehensive set of 
cultural attributes might be perceived as an obstacle in the way of post-
immigration communities to subscribe to the idea of a national identity. 
Citizenship and immigration law
Similar to the difficult negotiation of British identity, British citizenship 
had to catch up with changing conceptualisations of the nation state and 
with the legacy of the empire. One such legacy was the tension between 
broad principles of citizenship, which with the British nationality Act 
1948 granted some 800 million subjects the right to entry and settle-
ment on the British Isles, and the growing salience of anti-immigrant 
sentiment. The 1948 Act created the category of ‘Citizenship of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies’ (CUKC) and encompassed all formerly or 
presently dependent, and now Commonwealth, territories (regardless of 
whether passports were issued by independent or colonial states). 
One outcome was Caribbean immigration as migrants from the Caribbean 
were invited and recruited to assist in post-war reconstruction. During Win-
ston Churchill’s post-war Caribbean tour, for example, he famously appealed 
to Jamaicans to “Come and help rebuild your Motherland!” (quoted in 
Murphy, 1989: 88), whilst London Transport and the British Hotels and Res-
taurants Association set up recruiting offices in Barbados (ibid.). 
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The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act discarded the principle of 
free entry for CUKC persons and introduced work voucher quotas. It 
continued to permit free entry only to those CUKC whose passports had 
been issued in Britain and not by a dependent or protectorate territory. 
Later, the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act restricted the unquali-
fied right of British passport holding former dependents to enter the UK 
whilst the 1971 Immigration Act implemented a combination of ius soli 
(citizenship by territory) and ius sanguine (citizenship by descent) in order 
to severely curtail primary Commonwealth immigration by establishing 
a “partiality” clause (or the right to abode) as the legal basis of rightful 
belonging. Instead of replacing the CUKC with an exclusive definition of 
British citizenship, the Act put Commonwealth immigrants on the same 
legal footing as other aliens whilst prioritising entry from the ‘old Com-
monwealth’ if people from Australia, Canada and new Zealand could 
demonstrate British lineage (and others such as Anglo-Indians). The 1981 
nationality Act later withdrew a right to settlement to most Common-
wealth citizens.
 
Table 2. Main Minority and Immigrant Groups in Britain and their Dimensions of Difference
Dimensions of difference Citizenship Racial Ethnic Religious Cultural Linguistic
native minorities
Welsh X
Scots
irish
immigrants 
Bangladeshis X X X X X
indians X X X X X
Pakistanis X X X X X
Black Caribbeans X X X
Africans X X X X X
‘A8’ Countries X X  X
Roma X X X X X X
Source: Own elaboration
Race-relations legislation
The history of citizenship and immigration law thus shows a transition 
from imperial subjecthood to a ‘normalized’ version of national citizen-
ship, Britain’s racial equality agenda was developed in the context of 
such restrictions. In the first place, it took some time for policy makers to 
recognize that racial discrimination constituted an embarrassment and a 
normative, political and legal problem. In the 1960s, the ‘colour bar’ in 
British society, the widespread and open discrimination on grounds of 
race was increasingly perceived as a problem. The connection to restric-
tions of immigration rules was, as the Labour politician Roy Hattersley 
MP suggested, that “[w]ithout integration, limitation is inexcusable; 
without limitation, integration is impossible”. The outset of the British 
racial equality agenda was thus conditionally tied to restrictions of immi-
gration. 
There has been legislation in United Kingdom outlawing discrimination 
on racial grounds since the mid-sixties. The Race Relations Act 1965 
introduced relatively moderate legislation outlawing discrimination, 
based upon colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or 
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national origins, but not on grounds of religion or belief, such as in rela-
tion to access to premises open to the public such as hotels, bars and 
restaurants. Three years later, and running parallel to the aforementioned 
Commonwealth Immigration Act 1968, an additional Race Relations Act 
(1968) extended protection to employment, housing, education and the 
provision of further goods, facilities and services. The main legislation 
currently in force is the Race Relations Act 1976, as amended in 2000, 
which provides individuals with the right to bring civil proceedings for 
discrimination, defines permitted ‘positive action’, established the Com-
mission for Racial Equality (CRE), and covers all areas of employment, 
education, housing and, more recently, urban planning. 
This legislation was substantially strengthened by the Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act 2000 after the inquiry into the London Metropolitan 
Police investigation of the murdered black teenager Stephen Lawrence, 
which extended its scope to cover nearly all functions of public authori-
ties (for the first time including the police but still excluding the immigra-
tion service), simultaneously widening the remit of the statutory duty of 
public authorities to promote race equality. The way in which this Act 
relates to the longer history of British colour racism and, in particular, to 
the theme of ‘black criminality’ will be one of the concerns of the follow-
ing (see 3.b), as well as the more recent efforts to update the equality 
agenda with the Equalities Act 2010 (3.c).
Multiculture and ethno-religious identities
There are contending perspectives on cultural diversity in Britain. The 
‘super diversity’ theme that we have introduced previously points to a 
fragmentation of difference, as the sheer diversity of the various minor-
ity groups makes it difficult to lump them together. It contrasts with a 
continued interest in groups, their claims and their political agency. A 
related tension exists between, on one hand, ‘multiculture’ that prioritises 
practices of mixing and hybridity, and, on the other, a perspective that 
considers and takes seriously claims geared towards the preservation of 
difference. 
‘Multiculture’ has been coined in relation to situations of everyday cultur-
al and ethnic diversity, ‘conviviality’ and particularly the Black-Caribbean 
experience in Britain. It captures moments of contact, mixing, cultural 
exchange and interaction often in, but not restricted to, urban settings. It 
is concerned with the hybridisation of culture and the creation of cultural 
and social spaces that allow for relatively effortless encounters. ‘Multicul-
ture’ is generally not introduced as a programme of social change that 
would lend itself to implementation by policy makers and in public insti-
tutions. Paul Gilroy (1995: 4) suggests that it is not a “clearly delineat- 
ed goal or a reified state”; rather, it is something that happens in the 
microcosm of urban life. It consists of the “promise and hetero-cultural 
dynamism of contemporary metropolitan life” (ibid.). 
While the history of immigration in the United Kingdom is one of hybrid-
ity and cultural change, it is equally marked by attempts to maintain 
ideas and practices, or to change them in a way that preserves the core 
of what is considered valuable. Where the goal of ‘multiculture’ is to 
transcend the mere presence of cultural difference in favour of a hybridi-
zation of minority and majority culture, the claims of ethno-religious 
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difference are for public spaces that allow for, refrain from penalizing, 
and, ideally, respect the simultaneous assertion of claims for difference 
and inclusion. The goal is to transform the public sphere in order to turn 
negative into positive difference and to allow for the expression of reli-
gious beliefs and the accommodation of religious practices in the public 
rather than their confinement in the private realm (Modood, 2007). 
Cultural diversity challenges in a historical perspective
In Britain the distinction between ‘multiculture’ and ethno-religious differ-
ence is despite the fact that a conventional view had assumed a unity of 
experience, claims and politics. With the fracturing of ‘political blackness’ 
in the late 1980s and in the course of a new Muslim assertiveness dis-
similarities between the politics of minority groups became more apparent. 
Such dissimilarities have challenged the idea of a unified politics of multi-
culturalism and so they also challenge a one-size-fits-all type of tolerance. 
This part of the report investigates how both types of differences 
have been made and re-made. It is concerned with moments of cor-
respondence and separation and with coalition-building and political 
antagonism. It does not claim that the experience of Black-Caribbeans is 
synonymous with ‘multiculture’ while the claims of British Muslims cor-
respond, in each and every case, with the preservation of ethno-religious 
difference. It does, however, suggest that the way British multiculturalism 
has developed over the last decades makes it reasonable to discuss ‘mul-
ticulture’ with reference to the Black-Caribbean experience and ethno-
religious diversity with reference to British Muslims. 
We need to take account of the Black-Caribbean presence and the 
Asian, and in particular Muslim, presence in the United Kingdom and of 
the claims to public accommodation and tolerance that have been put 
forward by members of these groups. The discussion is organised along 
three periods, 1948-1989 (with emphasis on the 1980s), 1989-2001 and 
from 2001 onwards. Rather than offering a detailed chronology and an 
in-depth account of post-immigration communities in Britain, it high-
lights crucial events of political mobilization that paved the way for new 
politicizations of difference, new grievances and new claims. Finally, it 
highlights social practices of ‘racial mixing’ and religious claims-making, 
in particular in the area of public education, and attempts a snapshot of 
the various responses such practices have elicited by majority society.
1948-1989: The development of post-immigration communities
The British experience of ‘coloured immigration’ has been seen as an 
Atlantocentric legacy of the slave trade, and policy and legislation were 
formed in the 1960s in the shadow of the US civil rights movement, 
black power discourse and the inner-city riots in Detroit, Watts and 
elsewhere. It was, therefore, dominated by the idea of ‘race’, more spe-
cifically by the idea of a black-white dualism. 
It was also shaped by the imperial legacy, one aspect of which was that 
all colonials and citizens of the Commonwealth were ‘subjects of the 
Crown’. As such they had rights of entry into the UK and entitlement to 
all the benefits enjoyed by Britons, from nHS treatment to social security 
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and the vote (The right to entry was successively curtailed from 1962 so 
that, while in 1960 Britain was open to the Commonwealth but closed 
to Europe, twenty years later the position was fully reversed).
Socio-economically, ethnic minorities entered British society at the bot-
tom. The need in Britain was for cheap, unskilled labour to perform 
those jobs in an expanding economy which white people no longer 
wished to do, and the bulk of the immigration occurred in response to 
this need. Research from the 1960s onwards established quite clearly 
that non-white people had a much worse socio-economic profile than 
white people and that racial discrimination was one of the principal 
causes. 
Anti-discrimination legislation was introduced in 1965 and strengthened 
in 1968 and 1976. While this eliminated the open discrimination that 
was common up to that time (the ‘colour bar’), it did not mitigate its 
various less visible forms. The public appeal of anti-immigration rhetoric, 
its emphasis on themes of cultural incompatibility and conflict (Enoch 
Powell’s Rivers of Blood address; Britain, according to Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher, being ‘swamped’ by immigrants), did not contribute 
to an atmosphere of respect towards post-immigration communities. 
In line with anxieties over immigration that were (and are) open to be 
mobilized, the extension of racial equality was connected to restriction of 
entry: “without integration, limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, 
integration is impossible” (Roy Hattersley). 
Even though this logic furthered the expansion of rights for those post-
immigration groups already present, it did nothing to change that the 
presence of ethnic minorities was seen as a problem. Despite the aboli-
tion of the open “colour bar”, racism persisted in crude and polite forms 
(Fenton, 1999). The history of Britain as an immigration country is thus 
not only one of accommodation and increasing equality for settled com-
munities, but also one of the changing ways in which the presence of 
ethnic minority groups is considered problematic.
Black Caribbeans
A symbolic moment in the beginning Black-Caribbean presence was the 
landing of the S.S. Empire Windrush in June 1948 with 491 Jamaicans 
on board responding to appeals by Winston Churchill, amongst others, 
to come help ‘rebuild the Motherland’. Annual arrivals from 1948 to 
1952 numbered under 27,550. For several reasons including the United 
States Immigration and nationality Act (InA) (1952) (also known as the 
McCarran-Walter Act) curbing Caribbean emigration to the US; econom-
ic and political instability accompanying immediate decolonization; and 
the growing threat of immigration legislation in Britain, a dominant view 
arose that prospective immigrants had to leave the Caribbean imme-
diately – ‘to beat the ban’ (Hiro, 1992) - or not at all. By 1960, annual 
arrivals rose to 49,650 before increasing to 66,300 during the following 
year. By the time the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was intro-
duced the number had decreased to 31,800. Soon after arrivals from the 
Caribbean numbered only 3,241 in 1963, but peaked at 14,848 in 1965 
before falling rapidly to less than 10,000 in the average year. By 1976 
the Caribbean immigrant and post-immigrant population had reached 
half a million people.
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Black-Caribbeans arriving in Britain were highly anglicized (Hiro, 1992: 
19-25). nonetheless, they encountered a hostile environment with ‘no 
Coloured’ or ‘Europeans only’ signs in frequent display. The ‘colour bar’ 
in British society and widespread attitudes of hostility made the early 
presence of Black-Caribbeans, and their position in employment, hous-
ing and public services, marginal and problematic. The characterization 
of what made their presence problematic, however, changed over time. 
In line with biological racism and powerful cultural conceptions, ‘misce-
genation’, racial mixing and inter-ethnic partnering, was one such prob-
lem account. Laziness, drug use, prostitution and disease were additional 
notions applied in public discourse to characterize the Black-Caribbean 
population (Gilroy, 2002). The 1970s saw in particular the discovery of 
‘black criminality’ (see below). 
The anti-racist mobilization of the 1980s, as well as various outbreaks of 
urban unrest (‘race riots’), was not least in response to the discriminatory 
exercise of police powers towards black people. Conflicts occurred fre-
quently in the proximity of youth clubs, parties, reggae festivals and local 
fairs when police intervened to ‘restore order’. Observing that public dis-
order often broke out around such venues, a memorandum by the Lon-
don police force, the Met, remarked in 1976 with a measure of surprise 
that “members of London’s West Indian community do appear to share 
a group consciousness” (quoted in Gilroy, 2002: 118). 
Inspired by the politicisation of black cultural expression and black pride 
in the United States, the quest for self-affirmation and the celebration 
of black identity occurred in the context of a discovery of new types of 
expression in art, music and literature. Arguably, the gradual normaliza-
tion of the Black-Caribbean presence in Britain is closely connected to 
the development of these cultural forms and to their adoption in majority 
youth and popular culture (Gilroy, 2002: 204-5). This route, however, has 
not been without setbacks and contradictions. In particular, the appeal 
of black culture and the development of hybrid cultural forms in black 
urban Britain did not mean that prejudices vanished, as, for example, in 
relation to how the theme of ‘black criminality’ became a widespread 
image in the media and public representation in the course of the 1970s 
(Hall et al., 1978). 
Asians
The British Asian presence in the United Kingdom is a result of labour 
migration in the 1950s and 1960s, of the expulsion of Indians from East 
Africa in the early 1970s, and of the family unification that continued 
after the restrictions of the late 1960s and up to the mid-1980s. While 
‘Asian’ refers to South Asian and, in particular, to Indian, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi origins, the label covers a variety of backgrounds. It includes 
Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims as well as a variety of languages or dialects. 
It entails a variety of local backgrounds that are of importance for 
understanding how patterns of kinship and solidarity impact on political 
mobilization. 
While the majority of Indians is of Punjabi or Gujarati background, some 
London boroughs, in particular Southall, are home to large numbers of 
Sikhs. Bradford Muslims, for example, originate in particular from the 
Mirpur district of Pakistani Kashmir. Diverse patterns of local settlement 
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and the variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds point to difficulties 
with the label ‘Asian’. ‘Political blackness’ as a designator for shared 
Black and Asian experiences came under increasing strain in the course 
of the 1980s. 
The category ‘Asian’, in turn, encompasses a variety of experiences 
and position that made this label too appear rather loose and increas-
ingly meaningless for an understanding of political mobilization among 
differentiated communities. Majority perceptions of the difference rep-
resented by Asians and black Caribbeans further served to separate the 
two. Michael Banton (1979: 242) captured such changing problematisa-
tions of difference in earlier decades of the post-immigration presence:
the English seemed to display more hostility towards the West 
Indians because they sought a greater degree of acceptance than the 
English wished to accord; in more recent times there seemed to have 
been more hostility towards Asians because they are insufficiently 
inclined to adopt the English ways. 
More recently, Pnina Werbner (2004: 899) points to a further, internal 
differentiation that leads her to identify two diasporic spheres of British 
Asianness: “Whereas Asians are perceived to be integrating positively 
into Britain, contributing a welcome spiciness and novelty to British cul-
ture, Muslims are regarded as an alienated, problematic minority.” In 
addition, Werbner suggests that the way differences are negotiated 
within Asian communities is muddled and conflictual. Intellectuals and 
artists within the minority groups challenge customs and traditional 
structures of authority. Their contributions, such as Salman Rushdie’s 
writings or movies like Bend it like Beckham not only give accounts of 
the negotiation of difference in minority groups but are increasingly well 
received by British majority society. 
This hybrid and, in Werbner’s terms, “impure” sphere of British Asianness 
contrasts with a second sphere of diaspora where differences are pre-
served and kinship groups continue to play a significant role. The average 
Pakistani in Britain, for instance, feels a sense of not only belonging to an 
extended family but also to a birādari (kinship group) of which a branch is 
in Britain but the centre of which is in Pakistan (Shaw, 2000). 
Such patterns and practices, for Pakistanis and other South Asian groups, 
are neither stable nor deterministic of individual behaviour. They do how-
ever constitute repertories of identification that continue to be meaning-
ful and important for significant numbers of people. For British Muslims 
such differences of kinship groups and the diversity of cultures, languag-
es and national backgrounds have meant that a homogeneous version 
of British Islam has not emerged, nor is it likely that it will. nonetheless, 
shared belief (as well as the shared experience of rejection on grounds 
of belief) have meant that in recent years Muslim identity has become 
increasingly salient.
Political blackness
While the politics of difference in the United Kingdom underpins 
various kinds of political claims and types of cultural expression, there 
has been considerable reluctance to differentiate. The categories of 
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‘political blackness’ proceeded from the idea of a shared experience 
of discrimination across ethnic and religious backgrounds. The British 
population was thus divided into two groups, black and white. The 
former consisted of all those people who were potential victims of 
colour racism, though in both theory and practice they were assumed 
disproportionately to have the characteristics of the African-Caribbean 
population (Modood, 1994). Thus a fundamental problem for politi-
cal blackness came from an internal ambivalence, namely whether 
blackness as a political identity was sufficiently distinct from and could 
mobilize without blackness as an ethnic pride movement of people 
of African descent. This black identity movement, in a growing cli-
mate of opinion favourable to identity politics of various kinds, was 
successful in shifting the terms of the debate from colour-blind indi-
vidualistic assimilation to questions about how white British society 
had to change to accommodate new groups. 
But its success in imposing a singular identity upon a diverse ethnic 
minority population was temporary and illusory. What it did was pave 
the way to a plural ethnic assertiveness, as South Asian groups, including 
Muslims, borrowed the logic of ethnic pride and tried to catch up with 
the success of a newly legitimized black public identity. Indeed, it is best 
to see this development of racial explicitness and positive blackness as 
part of a wider socio-political climate which is not confined to race and 
culture or non-white minorities. Feminism, gay pride, quebecois nation-
alism, and the revival of Scottishness are some prominent examples of 
these new identity movements which have come to be an important 
feature in many countries, especially those in which class politics has 
declined. 
While anti-racism and political multiculturalism in the period up to the 
late 1980s operated and mobilized with reference to a unified position 
of ‘political blackness’, this position turned out less and less suitable for 
the actual issues of anti-racist concern. This became more apparent in 
the course of Brixton riots of 1981 and the ‘Honeyford affair’ of 1986.
New cross fire and Brixton riots
We have already suggested that the Black-Caribbean presence in Britain 
has been associated with various and changing types of problems. 
‘Miscegenation’ was one such problem account that we will return to 
below. Another one was black criminality. This theme was developed 
and extended in the course of the 1970s (Hall et al., 1978; Gilroy, 2002: 
Ch. 3). In particular low-level street criminality, mugging, was framed 
as a quintessentially black type of deviance. The police response was to 
identify ‘high risk’ neighbourhoods in which it would come down in a 
heavy-handed manner, using stop and search laws (so-called ‘sus’ laws) 
in a fashion that amounted, frequently, to racial profiling. The insensi-
tivity, if not downright racism, of such operations precipitated hostility 
towards the police. 
While ‘sus’ operations created tensions in a variety of British communi-
ties, 1981 saw a heightening of such tensions in London. A fire in new 
Cross, south-east London, that led to the death of thirteen black teen-
agers marked the starting point for remarkable episodes of unrest. It 
is contested whether, in an area known for racist attacks, the fire was 
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deliberately set off or the result of an accident. It is clear, however, that 
the police reacted with insensitivity and indifference. The new Cross 
Fire, or—for those who took it to be arson—the new Cross Massacre, 
became the single largest moment of political mobilization, with 20.000 
protestors marching through London (Howe, 1999). Together with Oper-
ation Swamp ‘81, a particularly intrusive, heavy handed stop-and-search 
operation by the London Metropolitan Police (the ‘Met’) in Brixton, it 
marked the context of some of the most significant episodes of urban 
unrest in recent British history. 
The Brixton riots of 1981, together with various other episodes of 
unrest such as in St. Pauls (Bristol), Toxteth (Liverpool), Chapeltown 
(Leeds) and Handsworth (Birmingham) are frequently regarded as a 
turning point in British race-relations as they brought into focus the 
response of newly assertive youth cultures to the experience of racism 
and deprivation. The Brixton unrest became the subject of an inquiry 
chaired by Lord Scarman. Identifying the immediate causes of the 
riots, the inquiry pointed to “spontaneous act of defiant aggression by 
young men who felt themselves hunted by a hostile police force” (Scar-
man, 1986: 46). 
Controversially for those who subscribed to the notion of ‘high risk 
neighbourhoods’ to justify ‘sus’ operations, it thus took notice of how 
police operations and discriminatory stop-and-search practices had 
prepared the ground for discontent. In its further diagnosis, however, 
Scarman fell short in identifying more fundamental causes for the police 
conduct: how, institutionally, the theme of ‘black criminality’ permeated 
the Met and made heavy-handed and discriminatory policing the natural 
response to the ‘problematic’ nature of the Black-Caribbean community. 
The report noted how economic deprivation had facilitated the unrest 
and it advocated a programme of urban renewal that, due to a lack of 
funding, did not yield tangible results.
 The Honeyford affair
An early conflict in which racial equality, ethnicity, and religion came 
to be combined was ‘the Honeyford Affair’ (Halstead, 1988). Ray 
Honeyford was headteacher of a Bradford local authority school in 
which the majority of pupils were of Pakistani descent and Muslim. In 
a series of articles in 1983-1984 in a national right-wing journal, the 
Salisbury Review, he argued that the education of children such as 
those in his school was being stifled by the cultural and religious prac-
tices of their parents. These, he argued, prevented Pakistani ethnicity 
children, especially girls, from becoming proficient in English, partici-
pating in the full curriculum (e.g. in sport, dance, and drama), from 
socializing with whites, and from succeeding fully in British education 
and society. He was particularly critical of what he said was the wide-
spread practice of Pakistani parents taking or sending their children to 
Pakistan for weeks or months at a time, disregarding the school calen-
dar. These comments —many of which were indeed the concerns of 
educationalists— were presented in an extremely critical, generalizing 
way that portrayed Pakistani working-class culture and aspects of Islam 
in a negative way and were augmented by comments about Pakistan 
as ‘obstinately backward’, plagued by ‘corruption at every level’, and 
the ‘heroin capital of the world’ (Honeyford, 1984).
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The articles were judged as racist by white anti-racists, locally and nation-
ally, and some secular Asian activists, who initiated a call for Honeyford’s 
resignation, which soon came to be supported by most of the parents 
and the leading local Muslim organizations, including the Bradford 
Council of Mosques. The Bradford Pakistani community was agitated by 
the public airing of unflattering comments about them, exacerbated by the 
distribution of Urdu translations of Honeyford’s views by his opponents 
(Samad, 1992: 513). 
These communities, largely from of peasant Kashmiri background, cul-
turally more conservative, and influenced by ties of kinship, began to 
stand up for itself against what it perceived to be insults to its culture 
and to its religious restrictions, especially as they applied to gender and 
sexuality. Leftwing anti-racists therefore came to mobilize alongside 
conservative Pakistanis on the issue of community honour and in due 
course the alliance was successful and Honeyford was pressured into 
early retirement. The wider and longer-term effect of the alliance and 
of other local developments of the time was to develop the Pakistani 
community, especially the mosque leadership, as a political force in 
Bradford, at the expense of white anti-racists and others rooted in a 
secular, multi-ethnic coalition, as the former considerably outnumbered 
the latter (Samad, 1992). 
The Honeyford Affair suggests that, by the late 1980s, the label of ‘polit-
ical blackness’ had become increasingly unsustainable. Indeed, political 
blackness was unravelling at a grass-roots level at the very time that it 
was becoming hegemonic as a race relations discourse in British public 
life (see Modood, 1994).
1989-2001: New ethnicities, new claims, new politics
While earlier events had shown cracks in the coalition, subsequent 
moments of political mobilization showed the extent to which claims 
and grievances of different ethnic minority groups in British society 
developed along different trajectories. In the period from 1989 and 
2001, the Rushdie affair and the murder of Stephen Lawrence are two 
such moments of particular visibility. 
The ‘Rushdie affair’
The single event that most dramatically illustrated the emergence of new 
forms of ethno-religious actors —with again Bradford a scene of action, 
and damaged honour a cause of mobilization— was the battle over the 
novel, The Satanic Verses (SV), that broke out in 1988–9, with Muslims 
protesting its portrayal of the Prophet Muhammad and other revered 
figures. This time the secular anti-racists were virtually absent from the 
conflict, for while many were sensitive to the racial stereotyping and divi-
sions it was causing, they were unhappy that it was fuelled by religious 
anger. Above all they saw it as a case in which freedom of speech should 
not be compromised, but reluctant to join in the chorus against Muslims 
they mainly kept a low profile. 
On the Muslim side, however, it generated an impassioned activism and 
mobilization on a scale greater than any previous national campaign 
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against racism. Many ‘lapsed’ or ‘passive’ Muslims (Muslims, especially, 
the non-religious, for whom hitherto their Muslim background was not 
particularly important) (re)discovered a new community solidarity and 
public identity. This is movingly described by the author Rana Kabbani, 
whose Letter to Christendom begins with a description of herself as ‘a 
woman who had been a sort of underground Muslim before she was 
forced into the open by the Salman Rushdie affair’ (Kabbani, 1989: ix). 
What was striking was that when the public rage against Muslims was 
at its most intense, Muslims neither sought nor were offered any special 
solidarity by any non-white minority. It was in fact some white liberal 
Anglicans that tried to moderate the hostility against the angry Muslims, 
and it was inter-faith forums than political-black organizations that tried to 
create space where Muslims could state their case without being vilified.
Political blackness —seen up to then as the key formation in the poli-
tics of post-immigration ethnicity— was seen as irrelevant to an issue 
which many Muslims insisted was fundamental to defining the kind of 
‘respect’ or ‘civility’ appropriate to a peaceful multicultural society, that 
is to say, to the political constitution of ‘difference’ in Britain. The SV 
affair, then, divided anti-racists and egalitarians, giving rise to organi-
zations like Women Against Fundamentalists, an offshoot of Southall 
Black Sisters, who turned up at Muslim demonstrations to publicly 
express their support for Rushdie. Other egalitarians tried to assimilate 
Muslim concerns into the equality movement and to some extent this 
division has since become a feature within the broad politics of ‘multi-
culturalism’ in Britain. 
Stephen Lawrence and the Macpherson inquiry
On 22 April 1993, a black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, was stabbed 
to death while waiting for the bus in Eltham, South-East London. Even 
though the attack was visibly racist in motivation, the Met operated 
under the assumption that drug-related violence among teenagers had 
led to the stabbing. The failure to consider evidence that did not accord 
with the foregone conclusion that an altercation among criminals had 
taken please meant that the five suspects were never successfully pros-
ecuted (the testimony of Lawrence’s friend, Duwayne Brooks, who had 
been present during the attack was dismissed). 
The murder of Stephen Lawrence, and the police handling of the inquiry, 
thus pointed to, as Stuart Hall (1999: 189) suggested “how racialized 
difference is … negotiated at a deeper level, where unreconstructed atti-
tudes find a sort of displaced but systematic expression in places which 
the utopian language of ‘multicultural Britain’ cannot reach.” Only the 
efforts of Stephen Lawrence’s parents in pressing for an investigation 
into the murder of their son kept the issue alive in the following years, 
until the scandal attracted attention in the broader public and the main-
stream media (Daily Mail). 
An inquiry, commissioned by Home Secretary Jack Straw (prom-
ised when Labour were in opposition) and chaired by Sir William 
Macpherson, to investigate the Metropolitan Police’s handling of the 
investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence, detected both 
“incompetence and racism” (Macpherson, 1999: para. 2.11) and noted 
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the “hitherto underplayed dissatisfaction and unhappiness of minority 
ethnic communities […] as to their treatment by police” (Macpherson, 
1999: para 2.15). 
‘Institutional racism’, though no individually attributable racist conduct, 
were seen to prevail in some branches of the police and the report 
highlighted “the collective failure of an organization to provide an appro-
priate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture 
or ethnic origin” (Macpherson, 1999: para. 6.34). Home Secretary Jack 
Straw promised to make the report a watershed (see McLaughlin and 
Murji, 1999), and introduced the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 
that imposed a set of obligations on public authorities to deal with inter-
nal discrimination and institutional racism. 
There are continuing concerns about the disproportionate exercise of 
stop and search powers against black and Asian people. However, the 
years from Stephen Lawrence’s murder and since the adoption of the 
Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 have seen institutional discrimi-
nation on grounds of colour become an established concern. This has 
led some commentators, for example Trevor Phillips and John Denham, 
to diagnose the end of racism in Britain. While the last two decades 
have indeed seen great strides forward in combating discrimination on 
grounds of colour, such statements are blind to different forms of racism 
that do not fit the colour schema. 
Considering black/police relations from Scarman to Macpherson, Stuart 
Hall pointed to processes of “differentiation” among ethnic minority 
groups. With reference to findings from the Fourth Survey (Modood, 
Berthoud and Lakey, 1997), Hall noted that such processes undermined 
the tired notion of an undifferentiated block of ‘ethnic minority’ peo-
ple, homogenously characterized by their ‘otherness’ (Them), versus 
an equally homogeneous white ‘majority’ (Us) to whose unified culture 
and ‘way of life’ the former must assimilate or perish. These fundamen-
tally binary terms in which British race relations have been mapped have 
essentially collapsed. (Hall, 1999: 191)
The discontent that had been articulated on the streets of Brixton was, 
in short, not what brought Muslims to the streets of Bradford. While this 
does not mean that, in principle, solidarity between such groups should 
have been impossible, it highlights that ‘political blackness’ did not lend 
itself as a unifying theme, particularly in light of new types of Muslim 
political mobilization. In a very short space of time ‘Muslim’ became a 
key political minority identity, acknowledged by Right and Left, bigots 
and the open-minded, the media and the government. This politics has 
meant not just a recognition of a new religious diversity in Britain but a 
new or renewed policy importance for religion. 
After 2001: Cohesion, equality and islamophobia
Turning to contemporary conditions of racial equality and ethno-religious 
accommodation, various forces seem to be at play. The Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act 2000 revealed a strong commitment on the part of 
the Labour government to extend and consolidate the field of racial 
equality. This commitment coincided with a new accentuation of civic 
commonality and shared lives, a priority that was reflected in the turn 
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towards the concept of ‘community cohesion’. In the summer of 2001 
various episodes of unrest in the north of England, and the involvement 
of young British Muslims in this violence, were generally seen as a case 
for how previous strategies of multicultural accommodation had led to 
separateness and segregation. This was then diagnosed as a root cause 
of unrest, an explanation that could be extended to cover, in 2005, the 
bombing of London buses and underground services. 
Community cohesion and the ‘civic turn’
In the summer of 2001 after civil unrest and ‘rioting’ that had taken 
place in some northern towns, home to both a small and large number 
of Muslims, David Blunkett (2001: 3) stated that ‘one of this govern-
ment’s central aims is to achieve a society that celebrates its ethnic 
diversity and cultural richness; where there is respect for all, regardless 
of race, colour or creed’. In the same statement he gave notice of Home 
Office-funded teams which would ‘undertake an urgent review over the 
summer of all relevant community issues’ (Blunkett, 2001: 3). A con-
temporaneous local Bradford report set the pattern for official question-
ing of multiculturalism by arguing that particular communities, widely 
understood as Muslim communities, were self-segregating, an alleged 
tendency that was described in another report as the phenomenon of 
leading ‘parallel lives’ (Cantle, 2001).
In charging Muslim communities with self-segregating and adopting 
isolationist practices under a pretence of multiculturalism (for an analysis 
see Bagguley and Hussain, 2006), these reports pioneered an approach 
found in other post-riot accounts, and which provided many influential 
commentators with the licence, not necessarily supported by the specific 
substance of each report, to critique Muslim distinctiveness in particular 
and multiculturalism in general. This has given rise to discourses of ‘com-
munity cohesion’ and a greater emphasis upon the civic aspects of inte-
gration, which have increasingly competed and sought to ‘re-balance’ 
the recognition of diversity in previous discourse and policy (Meer and 
Modood, 2009).
It is also important to understand, however, that in contrast to the ‘civic 
turn’ in much of north West Europe, the original interest in civic matters 
in Britain was not stirred by Muslim political claims-making. For follow-
ing new Labour’s general election victory in 1997 a range of key actors, 
including politicians, pundits, academics, think-tanks and pressure 
groups, become increasingly concerned about a range of different prob-
lems, of which civic integration/participation was only one, but which 
mapped neatly onto the concerns of then salient social capital theorists 
such as Putnam with issues around trust, norms and networks (Kisby, 
2006). 
These perceived problems included concerns about a ‘democratic deficit’ 
and low voter turnout and, in particular, about civic and political disen-
gagement and cynicism among young people. And it is for this reason 
that citizenship was revived as an educational issue. What needs to be 
understood is that issues of Muslim integration initially came to rest in 
this mould before the mould would be later re-cast. Thus when the term 
‘community cohesion’ enters the lexicon, following an inquiry into civil 
unrest or ‘rioting’ in some Muslim areas in the north of England, the 
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commissioners conceive it as encompassing a ‘domain of social capital’ 
which facilitates ‘people [to] feel connected to their co-residents’ (Can-
tle, 2001: 74).
Equality and non-discrimination
We note the different trajectories charted in the legal system between 
those characterized as racial minorities and those conceived in religious 
terms. This is something that has potentially left Muslims vulnerable 
because, while discrimination against yarmulke-wearing Jews and tur-
ban-wearing Sikhs was deemed to be unlawful racial discrimination, 
Muslims, unlike these other faith communities, are not deemed to be 
a racial or ethnic grouping. nor are they protected by the legislation 
against religious discrimination that did exist in one part of the UK: 
being explicitly designed to protect Catholics, it covers only northern 
Ireland. 
Similarly, incitement to religious hatred was unlawful only in northern 
Ireland, while the offence of incitement to racial hatred, which extended 
protection to certain forms of anti-Jewish literature, did not apply to 
anti-Muslim literature. Many years after this complaint was first raised, 
the hand of the British government was forced by Article 13 of the EU 
Amsterdam Treaty (1999), which issued the Employment Equality (Religion 
or Belief) Regulations of 2003 which made discrimination on the grounds 
of religious belief illegal in the labour market, but fell short of demands 
for a wider social protection against incitement to religious hatred.
Of course while the directive was issued by the EC, it has been argued 
that it’s provenance in British and Dutch models such that “in effect, 
the British framework has been ‘uploaded’ to EU level” (Geddes and 
Guiraudon, 2008: 129). Indeed, it was not only the British but also some 
variation of the Dutch model, both of which are “linked to a network of 
actors including nGOs and academic activists with good links to Euro-
pean institutions, particularly the Commission and the Parliament” (ibid., 
133). The Anglo-Dutch led Starting Line Group (SLG), although never 
present at actual negotiating tables, is illustrative of the way in which 
tested practises from British and Dutch contexts could be marshalled and 
mobilised to influence “the content of legislation because they had been 
fed into the Commission policy development process”.
This in Britain was, however, only a partial ‘catching-up’ with the existing 
anti-discrimination provisions in relation to race and gender. While reli-
gious discrimination was extended to cover the provision of goods and 
services in 2007, there was no duty upon the public sector to take proac-
tive steps to promote religious equality as was created in respect of racial 
equality by the Race Relations Act (Amendment) Act 2000 and as also 
existed in relation to gender and disability, till the Equalities Act (2010). 
After considerable lobbying the government extended the public duty to 
include religion and belief and this was eventually included in this legisla-
tion that the recent Equalities and Human Rights Commission has been 
created to monitor.
As yet there is no prospect of religious equality catching up with the 
importance that employers and other organizations give to sex or race. A 
potentially significant victory, however, was made when the government 
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agreed to include a religion question in the 2001 Census. This was the 
first time this question had been included since the inception of the Cen-
sus in 1851 and was largely unpopular outside the politically active reli-
gionists, among whom Muslims were foremost. nevertheless, it has the 
potential to pave the way for widespread ‘religious monitoring’ in the 
way that the inclusion of an ethnic question in 1991 had led to the more 
routine use of ‘ethnic monitoring’. 
In sum, then, while original legal approach to anti-discrimination in Brit-
ain was the statutory tort of unlawful discrimination, subsequent devel-
opments, especially through European developments, have meant that 
this ‘public function’ of discrimination law has become more explicit. 
Moreover, UK discrimination law has come to accommodate some of the 
provisions of the ECHR through the Human Rights Act (1998). 
These developments have led to what is sometimes described as the 
‘constitutionalising’ of discrimination law. In other words the incorpora-
tion of the ECHR through the HRA has proven to be catalyst in shaping 
recent changes to anti-discrimination measures. This is perhaps most 
evident in the decision to name the commission entrusted with the task 
of monitoring the implementation and practice of all previous anti-dis-
crimination legislation, as well as the two most recent EC Directives, as 
an Equality and Human Rights Commission and the move to recognize 
‘intersectionality’ as a legitimate ‘ground’ in itself (Meer, 2010). Most 
significantly, the new legislative developments have, on the one hand, 
created a duty of multi-faceted equality in the public sector, and on the 
other hand, included religion. Whilst the latter involved the utilisation of 
an EU directive, it has gone much further than the EU required. Hence, in 
less than a decade, mainly under pressure from a Muslim lobby, the UK 
government has moved from denying the existence of religious discrimi-
nation to the strongest legislation on the offence in Europe. 
Definitions of respect and recognition in Great Britain
With regard to claims advanced by post-immigration groups, we have 
pointed out some of the dissimilarities. Diverse experiences and social 
locations underpin particular concerns, responses to different experiences 
of stigmatization and different ideals of equality and respect. Beyond the 
practical specificity of this variation, we suggest that there are two broad 
versions of claims and that accommodation may take two basic forms, 
equal dignity and equal respect (Taylor, 1994; Modood, 2007). 
Equal dignity requires the abolition of discriminatory laws and the 
incorporation of individuals despite their differences into a horizon of 
universal rights. Equal respect by contrast suggests that identity mark-
ers are considered for the value they represent to their bearers and that 
because of such differences law and policy need to respond differen-
tially to the nature of the difference at stake. Where equal dignity has 
not been achieved, this is more often than not a question of the inade-
quate application of principles of equality and non-discrimination. This, 
however, is not the case with some of the most contested demands for 
equal respect that are advanced in contemporary Britain. Here political 
debates often showcase fundamental disagreement over the respect 
and recognition that is due to ethno-religious communities in the pub-
lic sphere. 
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Recent debates on cultural difference in Britain have tended to pit the 
two varieties of claims and the ‘two kinds of difference’ against each 
other in a binary manner. Various theorists have over the last two dec-
ades contrasted multiculturalism with multiculture, suggesting their 
practical irreconcilability and a necessary antagonism. While to us such 
binary oppositions appear unnecessary (see Modood and Dobbernack, 
2011), we need to recognize that a regime that unites equal dignity 
with equal respect requires considerable fine-tuning and will inevitably 
raise conflicts and misunderstandings.
Britain is undoubtedly a forerunner with regard to the two domains. 
There has been a quicker recognition than, say, in Germany that post-
immigration groups were here to stay; a greater readiness than in 
France to make symbolic representations of the nation and the national 
story hospitable to difference; and a greater concern with equality and 
greater respect for differences than what has been achieved in com-
parable immigration countries. The following thematizes the achieve-
ments of the British case in relation to the horizon of public values that 
are present and discernible in British discourses on difference, as an 
institutional arrangement and in social practices. Such achievements, 
it may be worth restating, are neither unambiguous, nor irreversible. 
They should be seen as potentials that depend for their achievement 
on continued political effort, such as the pressure from minority groups 
and political actors’ willpower.
Values of the British regime of accommodation 
Roy Jenkins, we have noted in the beginning of the report, conceived 
of integration ‘not as a flattening process of assimilation but equal 
opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of 
mutual tolerance’ (Jenkins, 1967: 267). A value horizon of what 
accommodation, ideally, should be about was thus formulated early 
on: it includes equality in a situation where partaking in the benefits of 
equal political and social citizenship would not require immigrants or 
their descendents to abandon cultural or religious attributes. We have 
suggested that this idea remains a powerful principle that despite prob-
lems in its implementation constitutes an ideal of British multicultural 
acceptance.
The accommodation of difference by means of equal respect, what 
Jenkins pointed to as the legitimacy of “cultural diversity in an atmos-
phere of mutual tolerance”, has not been uncontested. It had to go 
against the idea of homogeneous white, protestant nationhood that 
Linda Colley (1992) points to as the past ferment of Britishness. In 
fact, as official discourse is ready to ‘celebrate diversity’, homogeneity 
continues to exert a pull such as when the space for religious differ-
ence is disputed or when economic crises reanimate racialized self-
conceptions. The Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-
Ethnic Britain (CMEB, 2000) highlighted how ‘rethinking the national 
story’, as the commission put it, was a necessity to open a space for 
post-immigration groups to find a place. This attempt to rethink Britain 
is not without ambiguities and continues to be marred by uncertainties 
as illustrated by Gordon Brown’s recent attempt to formulate a more 
tangible notion of Britishness (Brown, 2005). 
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Policies and institutional arrangements 
We have pointed to the successive consolidation and institutionalization of 
racial equality since the 1970s. It is arguably not merely a desire for stand-
ards of racial equity that underpinned this development. The agenda was 
partially driven, on the centre-left, by the guilty conscience of policy-makers 
wanting to compensate for increasingly restrictive immigration rules and, on 
the right, by the desire to countervail racist unrest.
In its early days as well as in its more contemporary development, 
the broadening of the equality agenda is characterized by successive 
‘discoveries’ of problems of inequality, invariably in response to minor-
ity mobilization. The ‘colour bar’, the openly racist discrimination in the 
labour market, including the public sector, and open racism in housing 
and social services, were first ‘discovered’ as a scandal in the 1960s and 
early 1970 and the first Race Relations Acts were thus intended to put an 
end to openly racist discrimination. 
The insufficiencies of these first responses and the continued presence of 
an underbelly of racism were again revealed and thematized such as in the 
uprisings in Brixton and elsewhere. A more engaged response to the persist-
ence of racism thus had to take account of more subtle stigmatizations of 
post-immigration groups, such as of the (more or less) coded representa-
tions of black criminality that Stuart Hall (1978) brought out. 
The mobilization against ‘sus’ in the 1980s is thus in line with the scandal-
izing of the police response to the murder of Stephen Lawrence in the 
1990s. Racism, in coded and institutionally entrenched forms, made pub-
lic authorities adopt racist practices and prevent them from delivering an 
equal service to the members of post-immigration communities. The new 
legislative response to the Macpherson inquiry was not least welcomed as 
it engaged with the deeper structures of British racism that had previously 
been left undisturbed. 
Equality in terms of the accommodation of religious beliefs and protection 
against discrimination on grounds of religion is, as mentioned above, anoth-
er area where minority grievances – after long debates and in a process of 
tough lobbying – have been heard and codified such as, most recently, in 
the Equality Act 2010. Opening a place in British education for non-Chris-
tian faith schools or allowing for Muslim curriculum objectives are further 
challenges that continue to be politically contentious (Meer, 2007).
As regards the political process, the adoption of equality measures rarely 
proceeded without pressure from below. Minority agency in various forms, 
through public protests, advocacy groups or party-political channels, played 
an indispensable role. The most recent elections showed for example that 
the British Muslim electorate, though politically heterogeneous and dif-
ficult to mobilize en bloc, was considered a force to be reckoned with and 
candidates from all three major parties went to lengths to vow Muslim con-
stituents. 
Acceptance and accommodation as social practice
There is hardly an unambiguously discernible picture of the values that 
are embodied in the relations between British minorities and major-
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ity groups on a variety of social levels. While this report has pointed to 
differences among post-immigration groups, ‘majority’ is an equally 
unwieldy denominator that potentially conceals the diversity of interac-
tions between minorities and different strata of majority society. With 
regard to ‘racial mixing’ we have suggested that this differentiation is 
highly significant. Differential everyday experiences of diversity need to 
be considered as well as the way in which various socio-economic groups 
may have different experience of the post-immigration groups and indi-
viduals they encounter. 
In a different matter, the problematisation of ‘mixing’, with its long-
standing history in the theme of miscegenation, has not been displaced 
but at least amended by the official theme of celebrated diversity. British 
diversity is in fact often presented as an ‘asset’, as was particularly dis-
cernible in the early years of the Labour government of the late 1990s or 
in the more recent run-up to the London Olympics 2012. Cultural diver-
sity as an asset is however at least partially counterbalanced by the rhet-
oric on immigration that tends to present outsiders as a threat to British 
economic well-being. The previous Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who 
was not above giving voice to such resentments – ‘British jobs for British 
workers’ –, experienced a backlash just before the May 2010 election 
when his remarks on the ‘bigotry’ of a staunch Labour supporter were 
accidentally recorded and subsequently made public. While immigration 
and asylum thus continue to be noxious political issues, such debates do 
not necessarily tarnish the more wide-spread appreciation of the fact of 
cultural diversity in Britain (MORI, 2005; 2009). 
Conceivably, the increasing acceptability of cultural racism and in particular 
of Islamophobic resentment may tarnish this picture, even though the sig-
nificance of ‘culture versus colour’ in British racism is contested. Robert Ford 
(2008) uses the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey to advance a broader 
claim on the relative insignificance of cultural attributes. Other data, not 
least in the most recent BSA survey of 2010 (Voas and Ling, 2010), appears 
to challenge his account (which still works with the unwieldy and imprecise 
category of ‘Asians’) in particular in relation to Muslims. 
There is thus considerable evidence of how everyday interaction across 
ethnic and cultural lines is more common and less remarkable than it 
used to be, say, two decades ago. There are practices of conviviality that 
are certainly difficult to capture with a view to how majorities tolerate 
minority practices. Rather we need to take notice of how in such proc-
esses of everyday exchange, as suggested by Paul Gilroy and Stuart Hall, 
culturally hybrid forms emerge and spread. The claims for respect and 
recognition that British Muslims put forward, too, are not predominantly 
about tolerance but for the public recognition and accommodation of 
religious belief. 
Conclusion
Summary analyses of the British response to ethnic minority difference 
run into difficulties. Contravening tendencies are at play and progress in 
one domain may well coincide with regression in another. Achievements, 
such as in response to the Macpherson Inquiry, are not irreversible. An 
increasingly entrenched animosity against Islam mobilizes not only fringe 
groups but animates significant numbers within majority society. At the 
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same time, the Equality Act 2010 points to the readiness to engage with 
the claims and positions of minority groups and to further develop an 
agenda of multicultural accommodation. 
Various scenarios are thus conceivable. The approach that was taken 
in relation to other types of differences could be carried forward and 
extended to ethno-religious groups; however, a second and equally 
conceivable path may involve a break from the better traditions of Brit-
ish multiculturalism and the rejection of identities and claims of British 
Muslims and other ethno-religious groups as impossible to accommo-
date. While there is the potential to ‘rethink the national story’ and to 
establish a kind of multicultural citizenship that has equality and respect 
written into it, there is equally the potential for regression even going 
back and beyond the norms of a more minimalist modus vivendi towards 
ethno-nationalist parochialism.
As was the case with the relative waning of colour racism, historical 
analysis suggests that prejudice, even when it is deeply entrenched, is 
not beyond change. Such change may be driven by the liberalization of 
new generations’ attitudes. It may also be prompted by new visibilities 
of cultural or religious groups and an appreciation of their place in the 
broader cultural, social and political context of the nation, its narratives 
and representations. While some of the examples highlighted in this 
report offer considerable hope, the contemporary situation is aggravated 
by the amalgamation of global anxieties with local concerns. national 
debates continue to be at risk of being taken hostage by the ‘clash of 
civilization’ thesis and security concerns continue to be unhelpfully com-
bined with questions of cultural pluralism. 
British cultural pluralism has been positively captured by two different 
approaches. Multiculturalism, as concerned with the place and claims 
of ethno-religious groups, and multiculture, accounting for life, social 
practices and cultural production in urban diasporas, fit loosely and 
imperfectly to the experiences of South Asian and Black Caribbean post-
immigration groups. Multiculture envisages the re-modelling of major-
ity society’s standards of acceptance in a way that inscribes aspects of 
minority identity into majority culture. Multiculturalism is concerned with 
the reappraisal of difference as a positive fact instead of an unwelcome 
aberration. Its concern is with equal respect and with the need for Britain 
to adapt its regimes of citizenship, policies and laws to recognize cultural 
pluralism. In particular the focus is on making Britain hospitable to the 
practices and claims of ethno-religious groups. Multiculture, by contrast, 
is concerned with fashioning a form of equality that affords minority 
groups a place in the cultural representations of the nation. One of its 
achievements, we have suggested, was the abolition of the stigma that 
was historically directed at ‘mixed race’ individuals not merely for their 
imagined inferiority or ‘problematic’ identities but for how they consti-
tuted a challenge to classificatory regimes of national belonging. 
The demands of both for public accommodation are discernible in the 
various claims and grievances of post-immigration groups. On the whole, 
British policy-making has been responsive to such claims and law and poli-
cies have been adapted to make space for various post-immigration differ-
ences, though this has been not without contradictions and countervailing 
tendencies. This report then suggests that there is the potential in Britain 
to further forms of respect, equality and multicultural recognition.
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What this report could not fully investigate is a further area of critical 
questions regarding toleration and respect. These are not merely thrown 
up in the relationship of minority and majority groups. They extend 
further to how different forms of difference can be brought together, 
coexist and acknowledge each others’ legitimacy. For Britain, this is the 
challenge facing multiculturalism and multiculture, as the two paradigms 
that have frequently put in opposition, rather than allowing for a mean-
ingful relationship and a ‘conversation across differences’ (Modood and 
Dobbernack, 2011). Too often this conversation is barred as the modali-
ties of one are imposed on the other. Among contemporary cultural 
diversity challenges in Britain thus numbers the challenge to recognize 
that the reality of post-immigration groups requires a pluralized norma-
tive and conceptual vocabulary that makes space for coexistence and 
respect between two ‘kinds’ of difference. 
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